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LOYALTIES by Daniel Patrick Moynihan. San Diego: Harcourt 
Brace J ovanich (1984). Pp. 96. 
This latest book from Daniel Patrick Moynihan (the Senior 
United States Senator for the State of New York) is written in an 
informal, conversational style. As in a conversation, it is clear that 
the book reflects the author's subjective associations of ideas as 
much as any logical, temporal or sequential structure. This book 
was clearly not written in what one might call the academic or 
mandarin style, the style in which one usually casts the important 
topics he discusses. Rather, it is written with a deceptive simplicity 
and a personal approach and manages to present felicitously the 
author's own views. Of course, if Aristotle was, as Bertrand Russell 
has told us, the "first professor," his teacher, Plato, was the first 
(academic) writer to present fundamental questions in a conversa-
tional mode. Since most writers on today's basic issues in interna-
tional relations are professors, we have become more used, than 
perhaps we should, to the Aristotelean style of presentation, 
especially in the context of the esoteric science of international 
"crisis management," than the Platonic or colloquial mode. In 
exposing one's thoughts to a wider public than the professoriat, it 
is, perhaps, important for an author to follow a more colloquial form; 
and Plato, through his Socrates, is still an unrivalled model even 
though much of Socrates' discourse seems more like thinking aloud 
than a presentation of an exhaustive analysis. 
I. THE NUCLEAR BALANCE 
The dust jacket tells us that in this book the author addresses 
three basic issues of the modern world: international peace, racism, 
and international law. The first topic might have been better 
described as a journey with the Senator in his pilgrimage of 
understanding as to what the nuclear arms race means to him. He 
does not comprehensively take up the wider issue of world peace-
for example, organizing for a peaceful world, including the necessary 
political, social and economic agendas. Nor is the agenda of peace-
keeping studied. What Senator Moynihan does is to specifically and 
critically review America's emerging and changing values regarding 
foreign policy where it connects with defense policy, especially those 
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values which underlie America's policy of nuclear deterrence 
("second strike capability"). He is troubled by his perception of 
recent basic changes in our nuclear defense policy. In this context 
he recounts the interaction of his thoughts as they subjectively 
evolved, with his experience of senatorial politics regarding the MX 
problem. Indeed, this key issue provides the focus of the second 
chapter of the book. He presents his argument in favor of his vote 
in the Senate against funding the White House's plans to build the 
MX missile ("too large to conceal and too 'valuable' not to be 
targeted," p. 7), and cogently explains his disquiet, since he is per-
suaded that the MX missile represents a shift from "deterrence." 
Starting from the premise of "crisis stability" ("the utterly 
essential consideration," p. 15), Senator Moynihan sees the MX as 
a major destabilizing factor in US-Soviet relations. His reason for 
this judgment is that if the Soviet Union had followed the United 
States' example and had deployed forces for the purpose of 
deterrence, then there would be little or no problem. But, he points 
out, this is not the pattern of US-Soviet relations. He writes (p. 15): 
But they [i.e. the Soviet Union] [have] not deployed their forces 
in a deterrent mode, as we [have] done. The size and number of 
their missiles could only imply a first-strike mode. This is to say, 
they are right out there in plain view, essentially undefended. They 
are highly, if not wholly, vulnerable to a first strike from the United 
States, but so long as the United States did not have a weapon 
capable of such a mission, the Soviet could, if they chose, keep calm. 
And they did. They kept on building, but not in a fit of panic. 
The destabilizing effect on the MX system is that, while their 
utility is to mount a first strike capability, they are themselves 
vulnerable to destruction by a Soviet first strike. He tells us that 
"the phrase is 'use 'em or lose 'em."' (p. 19) But, does this percep-
tion include continuing effectiveness, for the purpose of deterrence, 
of the other two supports of the United States' defense "triad" -
the nuclear bombers (the "improved B-52's") and the new Trident 
submarines with their new D-5 missiles? Would not these, if the 
MX missiles were taken out, continue to assure a second strike 
capability? 
But at the heart of the issue it would appear that Senator 
Moynihan, like the Roman Catholic Bishops in their 1983 Pastoral 
Letter on War and Peace, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise 
and Our Response, tends to share Cardinal Krol' s moral perception 
that while deterrence "may in fact have prevented nuclear war-
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fare ... the risk of failure and the physical harm and moral evil 
resulting from possible nuclear war remain[s]" (p. 14). He sees the 
Cardinal's 1979 testimony as being echoed in the 1983 Pastoral 
Letter's stress on "Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence 
and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race 
be reversed" (p. 14). This, at least, would appear to be the Senator's 
moral position, while his political position appears as a strictly con-
ditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence based only on prudential 
grounds 
But surely this is true of us all? Do we not, all of us, reject 
nuclear deterrence as a categorical moral value? No one can argue 
for the Truth, Beauty or Goodness of any nuclear missile- be it 
the Hiroshima bomb, the SS-18 or the MX. In our world today 
deterrence is an insurance: like all insurance it is merely a cost 
incurred through nothing more than prudential considerations. Why 
should anyone, otherwise, part with the dollars which go to pay 
the premiums? But, perhaps, at the heart of the difficulty is the 
fact that deterrence is only term insurance: it builds no equity. 
In this chapter, too, Senator Moynihan takes issue with the 
Pentagon's proposal to develop and deploy laser-beam satellites 
designed to destroy Soviet missiles "at the booster stage," i.e., after 
launching (p. 30). He sees this as an imprudent and impractical 
"escape from reality; the mentality of the video arcade" (p. 30). He 
takes the view that "there is only the remotest chance that even 
one of the satellites woq.ld work," (p. 31) but, at the same time, he 
asks us to "[c]onsider the heavens churning in nuclear inferno, while 
all those little dials and digital devices go blithely about their dooms-
day detail" (p. 31).1 While he is thus skeptical of the effectiveness 
of the proposed satellites, he asserts that the "Soviet military will 
believe that we will be able to bring it off' (p. 31), and envisages a 
desperate Soviet first strike to pre-empt the satellites from being 
deployed. This reviewer wonders whether the Soviet military would 
be oblivious of the other two legs of the United States' triad. Be 
1. The Economist, in a recent article Getting da out of nyet, THE ECONOMIST 13 (July 
7, 1984), writes: 
The "Star Wars" program of anti-missile defences, which Mr. Reagan claimed 
last year would free the world from the threat of nuclear attack, is also under fire. 
Congress is unhappy at the $26 billion down payment needed just to get research 
under way, and worried because so many American scientists think the idea won't 
work anyway. Even the President's men are divided about the wisdom of a space 
race with the Russians. 
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that as it may, Senator Moynihan calls for a "commitment to a 
guarded reasonableness, to that spirit which is never too sure [that] 
it is right" (p. 31). 
II. RACISM AND ZIONISM 
As the Senior Senator for New York, Senator Moynihan has 
a special interest in the State of Israel and in supporting its special 
relationship with the United States. But long before he stood for 
election to the Upper House of the Congress, and when he was the 
Head of the Permanent Mission of the United States to the United 
Nations, he strongly championed the cause of that intrepid little 
country. It is of great interest, therefore, to follow him as he traces 
the history of a growing campaign of hate expressed with increasing 
venom in a series of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, 
beginning November 19, 1975. The formula, reiterated like the 
political chorus of George Orwell's sheep, "Zionism is a form of 
racism and racial discrimination" (p. 36) or its equivalent, blare with 
the banality and venom of its originators. Senator Moynihan finds 
this verbal pogrom to have its beginning in the theoretical dilem-
mas of Russian Communism. Marxist ideology asseverates that the 
roots of all human relations and beliefs grow exclusively in a 
materialist soil. The means of production and the division of labor 
which evolve for the utilization of those inanimate instruments of 
production and for the distribution of the goods and services they 
put into society condition all other relations, ideas, beliefs and 
human perceptions. Religious, aesthetic and national beliefs and 
attachments, like family relations and affections themselves, are 
viewed as epiphenomena playing on the surface of the economic 
process. They have no reality independent of the socio-economic 
structures for which they are at once the excuse and the justifica-
tion. They are seen simply as rationalizing or excusing distortions 
and contradictions in the economic systems wherein they are found. 
For example, chivalry (as noblesse oblige) is perceived as one of the 
excuses for the feudal system's distorted allocations of resources, 
commodities and command power in favor of the knightly class. 
Similarly, in pre-classical Rome, the power of the hearth-gods 
justified the power of the father which, in turn, was the needed 
system for managing the inherited farms through generation after 
generation. 
The author argues that the persistence of ethnic identities 
testifies to the inadequacy of the Marxist theory. Religious and 
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national beliefs thus constitute the greatest threat to the internal 
unity of the Soviet Union and its hegemony over its empire. He 
points out that kinfolk of the Jews within Russia have created a 
nation state of their own outside the reach of the Soviet Union. 
Israel is an ideological rallying point and is a source of the continuing 
renewal of the religious and national identity of the J ·ews within 
the Soviet Union and its empire just as much as outside its borders. 
Soviet authorities thus perceive Israel as reinforcing the threat to 
internal unity-a threat created by bonds which do not wither away 
as epiphenomena should. Secondly, the State of Israel is perceived 
as a bastion of Western influence in an area into which the Soviet 
Union is anxious to expand. Hence, Senator Moynihan perceives 
that, in addition to the survival of primitive anti-Semitism which 
may still influence Soviet attitudes toward Israel (which he wishes 
neither to exaggerate nor discount), there are foreign policy and 
ideological motives for current Soviet anti-Israeli charges. 
After the Six-Day War Moscow saw Zionism amongst its own 
Jewish population as a serious problem and as comparable with 
other nationalist movements which had provoked the Tsars and 
their Soviet successors to suppress and replace Zionism with more 
conformist attitudes beliefs and commitments. At that time the 
authorities orthodoxly dismissed Zionism as a link between 
American imperialism and the Israeli bourgeoisie. As the Senator 
said, "this required no ideologicai innovation" (p. 38). But the Soviet 
propaganda machine did not rest there, but evolved a whole new 
ideological attack. 
Moynihan credits the roots of this new departure to a two-part 
article in the February 18-19, 1971 issues of Pravda which was 
"promptly" published as an English language pamphlet by Novosti 
Press Agency of Moscow (p. 40). He then credits Viktorovich 
Bolshakov, Deputy Secretary of Pravda's editorial board in charge 
of the paper's international department, with the authorship of the 
article. In it Bolshakov alleged that Zionists collaborated with the 
Nazis, kept order in Jewish ghettos and provided overseers for the 
death camps. Indeed, he alleged that the tragedy of Babi-Yar "will 
forever be a reminder not only of the monstrous barbarity of the 
Nazis but also of the indelible disgrace of their accomplices and 
followers-the Zionists" (p. 41). 
This, the author tells us, was the background of the General 
Assembly's November 1975 Zionist resolution. As United States 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Moynihan set up a spirited 
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resistance. It was unavailing. Because he believed that the Soviet 
Union and the Arab states had overreached, he felt that their ability 
to command their usual majorities had been impaired. He states 
(p. 42): 
The time was at hand for the United States, and the West, 
to make clear that we would be loyal to those who stood with us. 
There needed to be rewards and punishments, both concrete and 
avowed. The new nations in particular were learning their way 
in a new world and needed to have it made clear that there are 
matters the United States took with profound seriousness-even 
if other nations do not. 
The United States did not act as Moynihan advocated. He now 
sees, as he saw then, the Zionism resolution as being an opportuni-
ty for the Soviets to seize an initiative and condemn Israel in all 
the available organs of the United Nations by arraigning the leaders 
of Israel with the crimes for which the Nazi leadership had been 
punished at Nuremburg. Under the Ford administration the official 
United States policy in the General Assembly and the other political 
organs of the United Nations had been "damage control" (p. 44). 
With the Carter administration a new direction was invoked- "com-
mitment" (p. 44). Basically this policy's premise was that the 
majority of the General Assembly "must be right-or at least 
partially right" (p. 44). 
As a result of this new Carter direction, the United States 
voted on March l, 1980 in favor of a Security Council Resolution 
condemning Israel for the '"flagrant violation' of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention" -in fact a charge of genocide (p. 45). The United States 
refused to disavow this vote. It brought a nemesis to one whose 
fatal flaw was an impenetrable naivete. Later, searching for 
scapegoats, President Carter blamed this vote for his losing New 
York, a key state, in the 1980 Presidential election. But the author 
sees in that vote, in the General Assembly, "the essential Carter" 
(p. 57). 
In this triumph of Balshakov, furthermore, and the history 
behind it, Moynihan perceives the outlines of a sustained, world-
wide ideological struggle with the "forces of liberalism" under 
incessant attack- "an attack that the West somehow avoids 
knowing about" (p. 57). He sees the present phase of this attack 
as consisting almost exclusively of a vilification of Zionism and 
Israel. As this program of vilification continues, the world should 
remember that Israel is the only democratic state in the Middle 
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East enjoying a multiplicity of political parties, free elections and 
an open society. Focussing on these issues, Moynihan focuses on 
a perceived lack of loyalties to the country, to a belief in freedom 
and to the traditions of liberalism. If the hostile campaign continues, 
will that loyalty be found? 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Reviewing the United States' reaction, under the two most 
recent Administrations, to breaches of international law by the 
Soviet Union and other countries - for example the invasion of 
Afghanistan, the seizure of the United States Embassy in Teheran 
and the forwarding of Soviet imperialist designs during the Carter 
Administration, and, more recently, during Reagan's presidency, 
the shooting down by Soviet i~terceptor aircraft of KAL-007 with 
the deaths of all on board, including sixty-one American citizens, 
and the Cuban/Soviet build-up on Grenada- Senator Moynihan sees 
a dangerous and misdirected trend in perceptions and policy. By 
reacting with bewildered and angry injury he commented that the 
Carter administration turned "out looking like the third act of Rain2 
with no sense of principle left intact" (p. 62). This was clearly 
illustrated in Carter's reaction to the Iranian seizure of the United 
States' embassy in Teheran, namely his aborted helicopter raid 
which, predictably, ended the United States' hopes for vindication 
through a unanimously favorable judgment of the International 
Court of Justice. It may be seen, indeed, as a paradigm example 
of the theme of Rain, of becoming one's adversary. The religiously 
inspired President fell to the level of the Soviet use and misuse 
of force; like the equally sincere missionary he became the target 
of the Soviet Judge's (Judge Morozov's) mockery and scorn as, 
indeed, his doppelganger in Rain became the target of the 
prostitute's contempt. Moynihan sees the Reagan administration 
as following down the same primrose path. He offers two examples: 
The Falklands Islands fight and the Grenada Mission. 
Senator Moynihan reports that he urged, on the Senate floor, 
that Britain take its case against Argentina to the International 
Court of Justice. He also claims that this "argument had enough 
force for The Times of London to report it." He argued that the 
2. Rain was a Somerset Maugham story, turned into a play and a movie, in which 
a missionary, seeking to bring a prostitute to Christ, finishes up having sexual relations 
with her, thereby engaging her mocking contempt. Inevitably, he was driven to suicide. 
The prostitute, reinforced in her skepticism, returns to her sailor clients. 
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Court would rule the Argentinian conduct illegal. This would have 
been the result, he believed, that if "the United States then chose 
to support the British, we would be free to do so under the color 
of the Court's orders" (p. 92). With all respect to the Senator, one 
must disagree with his evaluation of the Falklands case. His premise 
is that it was identical with the Hostages case. In this later crisis 
situation the United States needed the Court's judgment because 
it, by reason of the Soviet veto in the Security Council, was unable 
to obtain a validation of its position from that central, key institu-
tion of the United Nations. The Soviet veto, in fact, forced the 
United States to seek the Court's endorsement of her position. By 
contrast, Britain had the Security Council Resolution it needed. Fur-
thermore, once the Security Council had rendered its Resolution, 
it is highly probable that the Court would find a British applica-
tion to be, in effect, redundant. A close analogy to the Falkland issue 
was the Court's rejection, in 1976, of the Greek application to it 
for interim measures in that country's dispute with Turkey 
regarding rights to submarine areas of the Aegean Sea. The fact 
that the dispute had been the subject of a Resolution of the Security 
Council induced the Court to refuse Greece's application.3 Clearly 
3. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, (Greece v. Turk.) (1976] I.C.J. 3 (Order of Sept. 
11, 1976). 
At page 12 the Court states: 
37. Whereas the Court has cognizance of the fact that, simultaneously with the 
proceedings before it in respect of the request for interim measures of protection, 
the United Nations Security Council also has been seized of the dispute between 
Greece and Turkey regarding the Aegean Sea continental shelf; whereas, on 10 
August 1976 (the day on which the application and request for interim measures 
were filed), the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations wrote 
to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council 
in view of "recent repeated flagrant violations by Turkey of the sovereign rights 
of Greece on its continental shelf in the Aegean"; and whereas the Security Council 
discussed the question at meetings held on 12, 13 and 25 August 1976, with the 
participation of the representatives of Greece and Turkey; 
38. Whereas on 25 August 1976 the Security Council adopted by consensus a resolu-
tion (resolution 395 (1976)) by which, inter alia, the Security Council urged the 
Governments of Greece and Turkey "to do everything in their power to reduce 
the present tensions in the area so that the negotiating process may be facilitated," 
called on Greece and Turkey "to resume direct negotiations over their differences," 
and appealed to them to do "everything within their power to ensure that this 
results in mutually acceptable solutions"; 
41. Whereas both Greece and Turkey, as Members of the United Nations, have 
expressly recognized the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance 
of international peace and security; whereas, in the above-mentioned resolution, 
the Security Council has recalled to them their obligations under the United Nations 
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the Court would neither second-guess the Council, nor review a 
matter of which the Council was concurrently seized, nor give a 
pronunciation on an issue already resolved by the Security Council. 
In the Falklands dispute, Britain had the support of a Security 
Council Resolution denouncing the Argentinian invasion, requiring 
Argentina to withdraw its forces from the islands and calling upon 
both parties to settle their differences by negotiation. What then 
could the Court do? Simply echo the Security Council? Experience 
has shown that, when presented with effective action by the 
Security Council, the Court will hold its hand. Of course, should 
unmeritorious conduct occur subsequently to the Security Council 
resolution, the Court will, in appropriate cases, exercise its law-
fully conferred competences. It will, in such cases, resolve an adver-
sarial dispute giving rise to its contentious jurisdiction. (To this 
reviewer Senator Moynihan's proposal looks rather like a sugges-
tion that Britain should have unilaterally applied to the Court for 
advice and guidance on her legal rights and further lawful conduct; 
but this is a jurisdiction with regard to states which its Statute, 
perhaps erroneously, withholds from the Court, should states 
mistakenly seek its advice). 
With regard to the Court's jurisdiction, however, two further 
points should be made with regard to the Falklands crisis. First, 
Argentina has never adhered to the Optional Clause of the Court's 
Statute which confers compulsory jurisdiction on the Court, so the 
Court could not summon Argentina at Britain's unilateral behest. 
Second, Britain has, on a number of occasions since 1945, sought 
agreement with Argentina to take to the International Court of 
Justice the quarrels between the two countries concerning not only 
the Falkland Islands and South Georgia, but also the South Sand-
wich Islands and the disputed sector of Antarctica to the south of 
Argentina (including the Palmer Peninsula (Graham's Land)). It goes 
without saying that Argentina has always refused to litigate these 
Charter with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes, in the terms already 
set out above; whereas, furthermore, as the Court has already stated, these obliga-
tions are clearly imperative in regard to their present dispute concerning the con-
tinental shelf .... 
Accordingly, 
THE COURT 
Finds by 12 votes to 1, that the circumstances, as they now present themselves 
to the Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 
41 of the Statute .. . . 
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differences. Furthermore, if Argentina's then-ruling military junta 
had informally reversed itself and privately expressed a willingness 
to go to the Court at the thirteenth hour, the British Government 
might have justifiably suspected it of an invidious motive-to play 
for time. Having rejected the Court's jurisdiction so often, for so 
long, so consistently, so arrogantly and so condignly, a sudden rever-
sal by Argentina, after its landing on the islands, might justifiably 
have been suspected as being no more than a ruse de guerre-
Argentina could have sought to use time consumed for preparing 
briefs and arguments for fortifying its positions, for reinforcing its 
troops, for "digging-in" in the islands. Finally, in his presentation, 
Senator Moynihan does agree that (p. 92): 
The validity of the Argentine claim to the "Malvinas" has 
nothing to do with the illegality of its action. Under the Charter, 
Argentina has forbidden itself the use of force in settling such 
disputes. The Charter forbids it, and Argentina of its own free will 
submitted to that restraint. Britain was entirely in the right, and 
free to take any action it wished. 
As a signatory to the Charter the United States was equally 
free to honor its contractual obligations arising from Britain's 
stipulation in her lease of a base on the island of Ascension (which 
became a key staging point of the British forces) to provide supplies, 
fuel and military stores of all kinds when the British military had 
a need to use the base for lawful purposes. Of course, if the British 
had been guilty of aggression in seeking to remove the Argentinian 
forces, the leases stipulation would have been inoperative as, at 
least under the circumstances of the case, being contrary to the 
peremtory norm (the jus cogens) of international law which 
invalidates agreements to engage in, or support, acts of aggression. 
But, in the Falklands Islands case, the Security Council did not find 
Britain to be the aggressor. Accordingly, a refusal to honor that 
agreement would, especially in the face of the flagrant illegality 
of the Argentinian invasion, have rendered the United States 
delinquent on the basis of its honoring a lawful international con-
tractual obligation. 
Professor John Norton Moore has written, in a very scholarly 
study entitled Law and the Grenada Mission, 4 that in addition to 
the mission's justification as a rescue of American citizens 
4. J. MOORE. LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION (1984) [hereinafter cited as MOORE). 
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threatened with the possibility of being taken hostage (a la the 
Teheran Embassy debacle) or worse, the United States was justified 
in so acting by virtue of Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations 
Charter (collective self-defense with the Organization of the Eastern 
Caribbean States) and Articles 22 and 28 of the Charter of the 
Organization of American States. 
There is a further argument supporting the Mission's 
lawfulness which seems to have been overlooked by American 
skeptics of the legality of the Grenada Mission, but who approve 
of it as successful Realpolitik. That argument is squarely based on 
the letter of October 24, 1983,5 from Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor-
General to Grenada, to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean 
States, invoking their help. Their are questions as to whether Sir 
Paul had the constitutional authority to write such a letter, and 
whether the other countries of the OECS, and, in addition, Jamaica 
and the United States, were authorized, aside from the United Nations 
Charter, the OAS Charter and the OECS Treaty of Establishment, 
to respond positively to that appeal for help. International law has 
long recognized the right of an incumbent government to seek help 
from its friends to maintain domestic order as well as resist foreign 
aggression. A foreign state is not (aside, possibly, from the justified 
issues of humanitarian intervention, for example, for the validity 
of which some publicists have contended) entitled to intervene at 
the behest of an individual citizen of the target state. But, of course, 
international law allows such an intervention if it is made at the 
request of a lawfully constituted public authority with valid 
domestic competence to issue such an invitation. The question, 
accordingly, becomes one of whether Sir Paul had the constitutional 
authority to write such a letter in his official capacity as Governor-
General, or whether his letter was no more than an ineffective cry 
for help from a private citizen of Grenada. 
In those independent sovereign states of the Commonwealth 
in which the office of Governor-General (or Governor) has been 
retained, that officer is not the representative of the British Govern-
ment, but the personal representative of the Monarch as Queen of 
the country concerned-i.e., Queen of Australia, Canada, Grenada 
etc. The Governor-General does not represent her as the Queen of 
the United Kingdom. Nor does he represent the British Govern-
5. This letter is, of course, a key document in the issue of illegality. It is reprinted 
as Appendix I of MOORE, supra note 4, at 87. 
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ment. Where, constitutionally, the monarchy remains and the 
Westminster Model provides the blueprint of government, the 
powers of the Executive Branch are exercised by a cabinet which 
is both accountable to, and can command a majority in, the 
Legislature. Hence the Monarch (or the Governor-General) has no 
day-to-day power. Nor has she real power in times of stable party 
politics - the leadership of one party, or of a coalition of parties, 
will provide the individuals entitled to be called to form the govern-
ment of the state. But when these preconditions of stability break 
down, constitutional doctrine provides that the Monarch, or her 
representative, may exercise the "reserve power of the Crown." 
In an interesting article chiding Labor Party members of the British 
Parliament, as well as some members of the Government Party, 
for misperceiving Sir Paul Scoon's powers and obligations, The 
Economist pointed out that, "Sir Paul is the only remaining link 
with the constitutionality of a country that lost the rest of its con-
stitutional framework in 1979, and last month ceased even to have 
an internationally recognized government."6 
In addition to the powers of the Governor-General through his 
commission and the common law, it should be pointed out that his 
authority could be considered as continuing under Prime Minister 
Bishop's "People's Laws" of 1979, especially under People's Law 
No. 3. We may, further, refer to the Grenada constitution of 1973 
which established the office of Governor-General. The relevant pro-
visions are Articles 57, 61 and 69. The first of these, Article 57, 
provides: 
(1) The executive authority of Grenada is vested in Her Majesty. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive 
authority of Grenada may be exercised on behalf of Her Majesty 
by the Governor-General either-directly or through officers subor-
dinate to him. 7 
Then Article 61 provides: 
[I]f the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment, 
considers that it is impracticable to obtain the advice of the Prime 
Minister owing to his absence or illness he may exercise those 
powers [emergency appointment powers of the Prime Minister 
function] in his own deliberate judgment.8 
6. See Grenada: More Light on It, THE ECONOMIST 42 (Nov. 5, 1983). 
7. Constitution of Grenada, reprinted in MOORE, supra note 4, at 52-54. 
8. Id. 
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Finally, Article 69 provides: 
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any other law, 
the Governor-General may constitute offices for Grenada, make 
appointments to any such office and terminate any such 
appointment. 9 
183 
Whether or not Sir Paul Scoon acted under these and other 
relevant articles, while his commission remained in force and while 
the monarchy was not abolished, the inherent, common law and 
customary constitutional law powers of his office ensured the 
validity of his authority to act for the common good of his country 
in the emergency which actually supervened. 
This reviewer would also like to add a further comment he 
made in a letter he sent to the New York Times (which was not 
published by that august publication) on the issue of the legality 
of the Grenada Mission. After stressing the constitutional common 
law of many Commonwealth polities such as Grenada, he pointed 
out that there is a great unenlightment, in the United States, of 
Commonwealth matters. Had there been the needful light, the 
difficulty experienced here of grasping the role of Sir Paul Scoon, 
his competence, and indeed his duty, to send the crucial appeal for 
help, and the consequential legality of the action by the United 
States, Jamaica and the States of the OECS would not have occured. 
There would not have been the misinformation which was found 
on all sides. Had needful enlightment existed, the regrettable sen-
timents quoted (in a mood of criticism and displeasure) by the 
Senator from one of the most influential newspapers in the United 
States would not have been published in even the most parochial 
and bucolic newspapers in the nation. Senator Moynihan writes, 
"A Wall Street Journal editorial at this time began by recounting 
a dinner table conversation in which a guest declared, 'We are on-
ly going to be able to talk sensibly about Grenada if anyone here 
who is an international lawyer agrees to keep his mouth shut."' 
The benighted utterance by the dinner (not the wedding) guest 
would have been obviated, this reviewer believes, especially among 
the sophisticated circles which provide the Wall Street Journal with 
its readership and its newsmakers, if the Department of State were 
to overcome an ancient prejudice and install a Commonwealth desk 
in its hierarchy. This increasingly essential piece of Foggy Bottom 
furniture has never existed, nor has an officer ever been required 
9. Id. 
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to gain the necessary proficiency to man it. As a result, no Depart-
ment of State spokesman was equipped to explain the issue of 
legality in terms of Sir Paul Scoon's essential role. 
Around the world today there are many Grenadas, not only 
in the Caribbean, but also in every ocean of the globe. In many of 
them anarchy may, one day, supervene. Will there again be the same 
discordant and uninformed outcries claiming unlawful conduct if 
the United States were to intervene at the behest of another 
beleaguered Sir Paul Scoon? Clearly, a field of knowledge of the 
morality of lawful behavior is awaiting the plough of insight and 
clarity of thought. 
IV. LAW AND MORALITY 
This book's most important contribution, so this reviewer 
believes, has nothing to do with specific legal points which, in com-
parison with its main thrust, become relatively unimportant. It is 
Senator Moynihan's passionate commitment to the basic value of 
obedience to law. This is not itself a legal matter, but one of 
morality. Long respected and adhered to in America, the moral com-
mitment to international legality is an essential cement for the 
international community, and one which exchanges anarchy for 
common action, and Realpolitik for peace. In general, obedience to 
law is an independent moral value. It takes effect independently 
of an individual's concrete values such as commitments to the 
institution of marriage, family, social protection from many of life's 
handicaps or misfortunes, equal rights or any other projection of 
society's choices into legislation. For obedience to law may call upon 
the individual to comply with rules with which he strongly 
disagrees. While many people, from Emerson to the present, have 
engaged in civil disobedience and have refused, conscientiously, to 
obey a law they morally reject, they have, equally conscientiously, 
accepted their lawful punishment as a necessary result of their 
disobedience. But Senator Moynihan's vignette from the Wall Street 
Journal does not reflect such a conscientious refusal such as 
Emerson's; rather, it is a sentiment that international law does not 
operate constructively to further world community interests, but 
simply reflects a restraint on the United States' freedom to fur-
ther her interests in the world arena. Such a view sees a 
Machiavellian advantage in disregarding law. This is not civil disobe-
dience, but straightforward lawlessness. Senator Moynihan calls the 
United States to her traditional values of identify;ing her global 
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interests with international law and her long-established morality 
of obedience to law. This is not only a categorical value but also 
a prudential one. Obedience to law induces rational behavior and 
enlightened self-interest as well as the base values of peace and 
cooperation. In his final statement of loyalty to rationality and 
legality Senator Moynihan's book makes an important contribution 
to current ideas. And this reviewer hopes he will be persuasive in 
the Senate of the United States of the prudential merit of the 
proposition that the values of legality are more constructive, and 
more in the country's interest, than those of Machiavelli, the Medicis 
and the Borgias. The anarchic politics of self-interest which those 
men pursued, despite their hopes and indeed their visions, led to 
the abasement of Italy10 and the passing of greatness to other coun-
tries which emerged as the leaders of civilization through the 
binding of their diverse communities into their national legal 
systems through their acceptance of the moral imperative of 
obedience to law and the performance of legal duties. 
L.F.E. Goldie 
10. In her important new book, THE MARCH OF FOLLY, Barbara Tuchman writes of the 
six Renaissance Popes (including two Medicis and two Borgias) as, through their follies giving 
rise to the schism of Christendom and the inevitable triumph of Protestantism. B. TUCKMAN, 
THE MARCH OF FOLLY (1984). But our retrospective appraisal may be anachronistic. Those Popes 
were elected, not for their foolishness any more than for their holiness, but for their political 
acuity. In terms of the value system of the time, they were men of respect. Their parallel 
in England, namely Richard III, for example has passed into the opproprium of history despite 
his bravery as a soldier, the thoroughness of his political logic and his contempt for the 
restraints of morality. Sir Thomas More in his counterblast to Machiavelli's Il Principe, 
summed up the delusion and limitation of purely political solutions when he wrote of 
"England's 'Black Legend"': "Where he went abroad, his eyes whirled about, his body secretly 
armoured, his hand ever on his dagger." T. MOORE, THE HISTORY OF KING RICHARD THE THIRD. 
reprinted in 2 COMPLETE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS MORE (R. Sylvester ed. 1963). 
Fortunately for England (and Britain) the healing through obedience to law came with 
the Tudors. More generally, the issue was not one of the "march of folly" but of the lack 
of principle and the loss of morality. 
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CULTURES IN COLLISION-A CANADIAN-U.S. CONFERENCE 
ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY. Foreward by Goodwin 
Cooke. New York: Praeger, 1984. Pp. v, 197. 
CULTURES IN COLLISION represents the collected works of the 
Canadian-U.S. Conference on Communications Policy which was held 
in New York in March, 1983. Although the book does not attempt 
to resolve the complicated disagreements between Canada and the 
United States over broadcast policy issues, it does present a solid 
base of policy alternatives from which future negotiations can 
evolve. Given the current standstill in Canadian-U.S. negotiations 
over broadcast policy harmonization, this is indeed no minor 
accomplishment. 
The policy dispute in question stems from not only the pro-
found legal and historical differences between Canada and the 
United States, but from current and projected differences in the 
two countries' approaches to communications policy (p. ix). Indeed, 
as Ambassador Goodwin Cooke points out, "[t]he innumerable 
similarities between the two nations often conceal these differences 
... (p. ix). Resolution, or containment of the broadcast dispute, 
[therefore,] will require mutual appreciation of the differences in 
communications law, practice and policy" (p. x). 
CULTURES IN COLLISION is a useful introduction that will enable 
the reader to appreciate the difference inherent in this complex 
debate. The book addresses four principle areas: an historic com-
parison of Canadian and American approaches to broadcast policy 
(Frank W. Peers, p. 11-34); sovereignty and television (Mark J. 
Freiman, p. 104-21); the impact of new technologies on Canadian-
U .S. broadcast relations (Thomas H. Martin, p. 181-97); and the 
border-broadcasting dispute itself (Theodore Hagelin and Hudson 
Janisch, p. 40-99). The book also includes distinguished submissions 
by the Honorable Allan E. Gotlieb, John Meisel, Stephen Sharp, 
Leslie G. Arries, Jr. and Yale Braunstein. Each author's contribu-
tion is uniquely and equally valuable to the understanding of the 
broad range of issues addressed. 
I. 
After a brief foreward concerning Canadian and U.S. com-
munications policies and the impact of new technologies in general 
(written by Ambassador Goodwin Cooke), Canadian Ambassador 
187 
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Allan Gotlieb addresses "Culture and Communications in the 1980s" 
(p. 1). Gotlieb's remarks strongly indicate that Canada has opted 
for a new broadcast strategy for the '80s. This new strategy in-
cludes such policies as a dedication to the "expression of program-
ming choice" and the "strengthening of Canadian programming" 
(p. 8). These new directions, however, are contingent in the former 
case upon the success of future international agreements and in 
the latter case upon the availability of larger amounts of public 
funding. 
Canada's new strategy is also marked by an openness toward 
the United States which will hopefully promote greater bilateral 
discussion of communications issues. As Ambassador Gotlieb ap-
propriately remarks, "[a]t a time when many nations are erecting 
new barriers to trade, Canada is turning toward greater openness" 
(p. 9). Given recent breakthroughs in Canadian-U .S. cooperation on 
the use of domestic satellites for transborder communications, this 
new policy may indeed be quickly becoming a reality. Gotlieb con-
cludes by emphasizing that Canada has entered a new era; one that 
is "perhaps the most exciting" in the history of Canadian televi-
sion broadcasting (p. 10). 
Chapter two, written by Frank Peers, is a comparison of the 
origins and historical perspectives of Canadian and U.S. broadcast 
policies (p. 11). Peers explains the current divergence in the two 
nations' policies by emphasizing the differing Canadian and U.S. 
perspectives on the value and benefits of a free market distribu-
tion of broadcast resources. For Canada, Peers feels a growing 
discomfort over the vigor with which free market forces are turn-
ing Canadian communications into a U.S. subsidiary operation. The 
author explains that it is the need for Canadian sovereignty in the 
development of future broadcast policies that has forced the Cana-
dian Government to intervene on behalf of the communications 
needs of all Canadians. 
For the United States, Peers suggests that the free market 
distribution of broadcast resources has never been "seriously ques-
tioned" (p. 29). He relies for this analysis on the alleged inability 
of the U.S. government to appreciate the need for some level of 
safeguarding for the sovereignty of Canadian broadcasting (p. 32). 
While the author concludes that such safeguards are themselves 
unadvisable, both because they are unlikely to work and because 
of their implications for U.S. relations, the question remains how 
Canada can avoid safeguard policies, especially in light of the 
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author's strong belief in the need for a pervasive, sovereign govern-
ment presence in the Canadian broadcast industry. 
In chapter three, Theodore Hagelin and Hudson Janisch 
examine the border broadcasting dispute. Their discussion is divided 
into three parts. First, the development of the border broadcast 
dispute between Canada and the United States is highlighted 
chronologically (p. 42). Second, constraints on, and contradictions 
within, U.S. and Canadian domestic communications policies are con-
sidered (p. 56). Third, a model for analysis of the border broadcasting 
dispute based on a breakdown of the distinct concerns of the actors 
within the industry is proposed (p. 7 4). 
Hagelin and Janisch identify the exportation of U.S. network 
programming by border broadcast station affiliates into Canadian 
markets as the principal structural problem in the dispute (p. 87). 
Two proposals are offered to deal with this problem. They are: (1) 
that restrictions such as C-58 (the program which limits the ability 
of Canadian advertisers to deduct from income taxes the expenses 
of advertising on U.S. stations where the advertisements are 
directed at a Canadian audience) not apply to programming pro-
duced by U.S. border broadcast stations; and (2) that the network 
programming be distributed directly to Canada via satellite links 
to cable system lead ends (p. 88). 
Although these proposals do not embrace the interests of all 
affected parties, they provide a solid point of departure for further 
discussion. More importantly, especially in the case of the latter, 
they . incorporate newly evolving technologies into the on-going 
negotiating process. This type of problem solving clearly belongs 
at the forefront of the viable policy alternatives. Such suggestions 
encompass the means of both resolving the current deadlock, and 
easing the pressures for non-resolution inherent in the fears of 
unknown technologies. 
In chapter four, Mark Freiman addresses "Consumer and Na-
tional Sovereignty in Domestic and International Broadcasting 
Regulation" (p. 104). According to Freiman, who stresses the need 
for Canadian communications policy to "produce programming at 
all cultural levels" (p. 117), the path to resolving Canadian policy 
conflicts is not through the elevation of consumer sovereignty. 
Rather, as an alternative to deregulation or a general free market 
approach, Freiman postulates that the most likely and most prac-
tical method of achieving programming at all cultural levels is 
through the use of generally funded independent public national 
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broadcasting systems (p. 117). In short, Freiman takes the arguably 
controversial position that government regulation of broadcasting 
is more in line with viewers' true interests than individual consumer 
choice through the market place. 
In a critique following the Freiman discussion, Glen Robinson 
offers support for the elevation of public broadcasting, but then 
criticizes Freiman for not being faithful to his own principles by 
balancing the interests of national sovereignty against consumer 
sovereignty (p. 127). Robinson argues that if Canadian cultural 
sovereignty and the erosion thereof through U.S. programming 
dominance is really at issue, then the establishment of a board of 
censors is perhaps advisable (p. 127). Such a board would screen 
foreign-made programs carried on Canadian broadcast stations and 
cable systems. While Robinson expresses discomfort with a scheme 
which promotes censorship, he clearly also finds those discomforts 
outweighed by the projected gains for Canadian cultural preser-
vation (p. 128). 
In chapter five, John Meisel and Stephen Sharp address broad-
cast regulation in Canada. Working from an historical perspective, 
Meisel contrasts the Canadian need for regulation with the 
American need for deregulation. Meisel maintains that government 
presence in Canadian broadcasting is not only a current public man-
date, but one which has deep historical roots. This being contrary 
to the history and demonstrated needs of American broadcasting, 
there must and always will be fundamental differences in Canadian 
and U.S. approaches to the goals and methods of broadcast 
regulation. 
Chapter six, by Leslie G. Arries, Jr., presents valuable insight 
into the position of border broadcasters. As a U.S. broadcaster who 
has participated extensively in the effort to resolve the lingering 
policy dispute, his presentation shows a clear appreciation for the 
cultural issues which underlie current Canadian policies. Even given 
this level of understanding,. however, Arries does not sympathize 
with Canadian interests to the extent of such "unfair and one-sided" 
policies as Bill C-58 (p. 149). Arries postulates that such legislation 
is not only bad for U.S.-Canadian relations, but is not effective at 
promoting the very goal for which it was developed, namely, the 
promotion of indigenous Canadian programming. As an alternative, 
Arries urges the Canadian Government to use sources of funds such 
as cable systems profits to support and foster the Canadian pro-
gram production industry (p. 149). 
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In chapter seven, Yale Braunstein examines the economics of 
advertiser-supported television in Canada and the United States 
(p. 152). Braunstein suggests that neither program funding, nor pro-
duction, will be affected by Canadian policies aimed at the adver-
tising medium (p. 158). Rather, those programs both proposed, and 
currently in effect, operate most significantly as a means of actually 
diverting income from U.S. broadcasters to Canadian stations. The 
real irony of the situation, however, is that according to Braunstein's 
econometric analysis, there is no evidence of any significant negative 
impact on the revenues of the Canadian stations the current policies 
are principally aimed a:t affecting. Braunstein concludes, therefore, 
that the major problem is the propensity of Canadian television 
viewers to watch U.S. programming, not the propensity of Cana-
dian television broadcasters to seek access to the Canadian market 
through U.S. station affiliates (p. 159). 
Finally, in chapter eight, Thomas Martin analyzes the impact 
of "New Techniques and Future Technologies on Canadian-U.S. 
Broadcast Relations" (p. 181). After a careful examination of various 
scenarios designed to illustrate possible future sources of conflict 
inherent in the current drive toward advanced communications 
technologies, Martin is both practical and open in concluding that 
while the free market evolution of advanced technology may be 
legitimate, "there is no guarantee that wide-open competition and 
entrepreneurial spirit will lead to happiness" (p. 197). For that 
reason, as well as the recognition that government has a clear role 
to play in communications technology development, Martin prefers 
to see future technology breakthroughs preceded by bilateral 
agreements governing the international exploitation of new systems. 
II. 
CULTURES IN COLLISION is a book with a title that expresses 
most appropriately the sentiments of those familiar with the 
Canadian-U.S. communications policy debate. It is not only a colli-
sion which affects one of the largest and fastest growing U.S. ex-
port service industries, but one that touches the basic social and 
moral fiber of our two societies and the forms of government we 
have elected to represent those views. 
Whether the evolution of Canadian and U.S. policies will 
achieve an effective assimilation of the competing forces addressed 
in this book, however, is not the immediate concern. Rather, of 
highest priority, and for which this book speaks most loudly, is the 
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need for a detailed and comprehensive look at what possible solu-
tions exist within the realm of the realizable alternatives. 
-Ed. 
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